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Prospection is thinking about possible future states of the world. Commitment to perform
a future action—commonly referred to as intention—is a specific type of prospection. This
knowledge is relevant when trying to assess whether a stated intention is a lie or the
truth. An important observation is that thinking of, and committing to, future actions often
evoke vivid and detailed mental images. One factor that affects how specific a person
experiences these simulations is location-familiarity. The purpose of this study was to
examine to what extent location-familiarity moderates how liars and truth tellers describe
a mental image in an investigative interview. Liars were instructed to plan a criminal act
and truth tellers were instructed to plan a non-criminal act. Before they could carry out
these acts, the participants were intercepted and interviewed about the mental images
they may have had experienced in this planning phase. Truth tellers told the truth whereas
liars used a cover story to mask their criminal intentions. As predicted, the results showed
that the truth tellers reported a mental image significantly more often than the liars. If a
mental image was reported, the content of the descriptions did not differ between liars
and truth tellers. In a post interview questionnaire, the participants rated the vividness
(i.e., content and clarity) of their mental images. The ratings revealed that the truth tellers
had experienced their mental images more vividly during the planning phase than the
liars. In conclusion, this study indicates that both prototypical and specific representations
play a role in prospection. Although location-familiarity did not moderate how liars and
truth tellers describe their mental images of the future, this study allows some interesting
insights into human future thinking. How these findings can be helpful for distinguishing
between true and false intentions will be discussed.
Keywords: deception detection, episodic future thinking, familiarity, mental images, true and false intentions,
prototypical prospection
INTRODUCTION
Prospection is thinking about possible future states of the world.
This capacity allows people to better foresee, plan, and shape
their futures (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Commitment to
perform a future action—commonly referred to as intention—is
a specific type of future thinking. An important observation is
that thinking of, and committing to, future actions often evoke
vivid mental images (Goschke and Kuhl, 1993; Pham and Taylor,
1999). Also, mental images are more easily constructed if the
future event is related to a personal goal (D’Argembeau and
Mathy, 2011). Hence, being personally committed to a future
event affects the construction of mental images.
Prospection, and mental images in particular, have recently
also become of interest in deception research related to future
actions (e.g., Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Warmelink et al., 2012;
Knieps et al., 2013a,b). The goal of this research is to distinguish
between individuals telling the truth about their intentions and
individuals trying to mask their criminal intentions with a cover
story (false intentions). In brief, an intention is defined as an
actor’s mental state preceding a corresponding action which is
inherently accompanied by a commitment to perform a specific
action. Intended acts are often preceded by some degree of rea-
soning and planning and are directed at the intender’s own action
(Malle et al., 2001). Being able to detect deception about future
actions has clear societal value. At best, it could prevent crimes
before they happen. The main assumption in this study is that
true intentions correspond to the processes underlying prospec-
tion whereas false intentions may not correspond to the same
processes. Hence, false intentions may be accompanied by less
vivid mental images than true intentions; a difference which may
be reflected in an investigative interview. Research on prospection
may be helpful in capturing the possible differences between true
and false intentions.
PROSPECTION AND RETROSPECTION
People often engage into mental time travel to re-experience
the past (i.e., retrospection) and pre-experience the future (i.e.,
prospection) (Tulving, 1985; Atance and O’Neill, 2001). Research
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shows that our prospective ability rests to a great extent on our
retrospective ability. More precisely, our ability to imagine future
events with detailed and vivid mental images relies on mem-
ory, and on episodic memory in particular (for reviews see, e.g.,
Szpunar, 2010; Schacter et al., 2012). In brief, scholars generally
distinguish between semantic memory (i.e., the recall of general
factual knowledge) and episodic memory (i.e., the memory of
personally experienced events). For example, a person may well
remember the last time he or she visited Rome, and having a par-
ticularly self-indulgent dinner at a famous restaurant in the city
center. But if asked what is the capital of Italy this person may
simply say “Rome” without experiencing any personal recollec-
tions of the many times he or she has been there. Memory for the
dinner is episodic. Knowledge that Rome is the capital of Italy is
semantic.
So far, research on prospection has mainly focused on the
specific or “episodic” representations of the future emphasizing
its subjective experience (such as visual perspective and emo-
tion, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004; Van Boven and
Ashworth, 2007). In the scientific literature this phenomenon is
often referred to as Episodic Future Thinking (EFT; Atance and
O’Neill, 2001; D’Argembeau, 2012). Besides these specific rep-
resentations, recent research indicates that more prototypical or
“semantic” representations play an important role in prospection
as well (Kane et al., 2012; Martin-Ordas et al., 2012). Prototype
refers to “the class of generalized mental representations of what
people, events, and activities are typically like—their archetype,
their typical attributes, the scripts by which they usually unfold,
the instances that best exemplify an event, and so on” (p. 355,
Kane et al., 2012). It is possible that mental images of the future
contain both specific and prototypical pieces of information. This
is an important finding as statements that containing specific con-
tents, a feature associated with episodic memory, is regarded as an
indicator for the truth in the psycho-legal literature (Steller and
Köhnken, 1989). Hence, there is a risk that a truthful statement
may mistakenly be taken for a false statement just because it lacks
the specific contents associated with the truth.
One factor that moderates how vividly people experiencemen-
tal images is familiarity. Research shows that people, when think-
ing about events in the near future, tend to imagine themselves in
familiar contexts interacting with familiar people (D’Argembeau
and Van der Linden, 2004; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Gamboz
et al., 2010). Comparing the vividness of events shows that rep-
resentations of unfamiliar contexts typically contain fewer sen-
sorial details, occur in a less clear context, and have a weaker
subjective experience than representations of familiar contexts
(Szpunar and McDermott, 2008). Hence, the contents of simula-
tions of the future are usually characterized by familiar, contextual
information.
TRUE AND FALSE INTENTIONS
Recent research has examined whether mental images may be
helpful in discriminating between true and false intentions
(Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al., 2013a,b). In these stud-
ies participants were asked in an investigative interview whether
they had experienced a mental image while planning their future
action. The results show that almost all truth tellers did in fact
report a mental image whereas a participant who did not report a
mental image was typically a liar. If a mental image was reported,
truth tellers tended to provide relatively more words to describe
it (Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al., 2013b). However, the
content of the description did not reveal differences between liars
and truth tellers (Knieps et al., 2013a,b). However, when asked to
rate the vividness of their mental image in a post interview ques-
tionnaire, truth tellers tended to experience their mental images
more vividly than liars (Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al.,
2013b). However, this effect seems to bemoderated by the tempo-
ral distance between experiencing a mental image in the planning
phase and how it is perceived a week later (Knieps et al., 2013a).
All studies had in common that the participants planned
to execute an action in a location they were most likely to be
familiar with (i.e., the local shopping mall in town). As a con-
sequence, liars may have benefited from being familiar with the
location. Memory research suggests that familiarity influences
how vividly we experience mental images of the future (Szpunar
and McDermott, 2008). Research on true and false intentions
should therefore examine how familiarity affects the statements
of liars and truth tellers in an investigative interview.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The purpose of the present study is to examine to what extent
location-familiarity moderates how liars and truth tellers describe
a mental image in an investigative interview. Our main assump-
tion is that truth tellers provide richer descriptions of their mental
images than liars. This assumption rests on the finding that imag-
ining a self-relevant future event is accompanied by a stronger
feeling of experiencing and more episodic details (deVito et al.,
2012). We assume that cover stories are less self-relevant, if at all,
than true intentions.
In brief, half of the participants (the liars) planned a mock
criminal act (searching for an envelope containing illegal mate-
rial to deliver to an unknown person in the library). They were
also asked to plan a cover story, to be used to mask their crim-
inal intentions if stopped and questioned. The remaining half
of the participants (the truth tellers) was asked to plan a non-
criminal act (choosing a course based on the literature to be found
in the library). Hence, the future actions that the participants
were supposed to perform had an explicit goal, and the exter-
nal constraints (i.e., the where, when, and what to perform) were
clearly defined. All participants were asked to rate their familiar-
ity with respect to different libraries. Based on these ratings, they
were assigned to a library they either had never been to before
(unfamiliar-condition) or to a library they were highly familiar
with (familiar-condition).
We tapped possible differences between liars and truth tellers
in two different ways. First, we analyzed the liars’ and the truth
tellers’ descriptions of their dominant mental image during an
investigative interview. For truth tellers such a mental image was
related to the truthful intentions stated, and for liars this mental
image was related to the false intentions stated (the cover story).
In particular, we examined to which extent the descriptions con-
tained features associated with episodic memory. Second, we
analyzed the liars’ and the truth tellers’ experiences of their men-
tal images that they had rated in a post interview questionnaire.
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In particular, these ratings tried to capture the vividness compris-
ing different measures on clarity and content of the mental image
(see Arnold et al., 2011).
With reference to the EFT framework (e.g., Szpunar, 2010) and
previous empirical findings (Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Knieps
et al., 2013a,b), we predict that more truth tellers than liars will
report that they had experienced a mental image when plan-
ning their stated future actions (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, if
a mental image was described during the interview, we predict
that the truth tellers’ descriptions will contain more details than
the liars’ (Hypothesis 2a). The type of details under investiga-
tion were (a) target library (a particular location), (b) navigating
in the library, (c) navigating to the library (e.g., taking the tram
to the location), (d) visual details (physical information, such as
objects and people), (e) perception/sensation (e.g., sounds, emo-
tions, stress), and (f) obstacles to achievement of the goal (e.g.,
time pressure, other people, books unavailable). We predict that
truth tellers who were familiar with the location will providemore
details in their descriptions than truth tellers who were unfamiliar
with the location (Hypothesis 2b). With respect to the self-ratings
of the post interview questionnaire, we predict that the truth
tellers’ mental images will be more vivid than the liars’ mental
images (Hypothesis 3a). Furthermore, we predict that truth tellers
who were familiar with the location will experience their mental
image more vividly than truth tellers who are unfamiliar with the
location (Hypothesis 3b).
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In total, 120 subjects (76 women, 44 men) between 19 and 58
years of age (M = 27.78, SD = 7.47) were recruited to participate
in the experiment. They were guaranteed a compensation of an
equal value of 100 SEK for their participation (approximate value
of 15 USD). Additional monetary rewards were announced if par-
ticipants were able to convince the interviewer of their veracity.
DESIGN
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. Deceptive) × 2 (Location-Familiarity:
Familiar vs. Unfamiliar) between-group factorial design was
used. The liars were instructed to plan a criminal (mock) event
(n = 62), and the truth tellers were instructed to plan a non-
criminal event (n = 58). Based on their previous experience, half
the participants, the familiar participants, planned their future
actions in a university library they had visited before (n = 57)
while the other half, the unfamiliar participants, planned their
future actions in a university library they had never visited before
(n = 63).
PROCEDURE
Screening
After being welcomed by the experimenter, all participants were
asked to sign an informed consent form and answer some
questions on how familiar they were with four local university
libraries. We selected these libraries because of their proximity
to the Psychology Department and because of the similarity of
their interior layout (course literature and check-out desks on the
entrance floor). First, the participants indicated whether they had
ever been to the particular library before (“Yes, I have visited this
library before” or “No, I have never visited this library before.”
If participants answered “yes,” the next question asked them to
rate their familiarity with this library on a 7-point scale (1 = not
familiar, 7 = highly familiar). Subsequently, they were asked to
rank their familiarity with each library. Only people who rated
their familiarity with 5 or higher were considered for the familiar-
condition. If participants had never visited the libraries, they were
considered for the unfamiliar-condition. To achieve comparabil-
ity we used approximately the same number of participants from
the two conditions for each library. We also established a bal-
anced gender distribution for the different conditions and the
four libraries to eliminate them as potential confounders.
Planning phase
The participants were told that they had to successfully achieve
a certain goal (criminal vs. non-criminal) within a certain time.
They were informed that they were free to decide themselves
exactly how they were about to achieve their goals. More precisely,
the goal of the truth tellers was to “choose a course based on the
course-literature to be found in the library” (the non-criminal
event). By comparison, the goal of the liars was to deliver an enve-
lope containing “illegal” material to an unknown person waiting
close to the check-out of a particular library (the mock criminal
event). A second task for the liars was to plan a cover story with
the main theme “choose a course based on the course-literature
to be found in the library” to mask their criminal intentions.
This story was to be used if they were intercepted, and to achieve
high comparability between the events that liars and truth tellers
would later tell about in the investigative interview. That is, we
provided the liars with a frame for their cover story (i.e., the
where, when, and what) but made it clear that it was up to each
participant to fill this frame in order to construct a convincing
cover story (the how).
The participants had eight minutes time to plan and were
offered more time (four more minutes) if needed. Only eight
liars and five truth tellers asked for extra time. However, they
had only one chance to plan the action. They were instructed to
carefully plan their future actions and to finish all necessary plan-
ning before leaving the Psychology Department. They received
a map of Gothenburg, the locations of all university libraries in
Gothenburg, and time tables for public transport. Furthermore,
all participants were given a photo of an individual: the truth
tellers were told this was an individual who could assist them at
the library if they needed any help finding the book(s) whereas
the liars were told this was the individual to hand the envelope to
at the library.
Also, all participants had access to a brochure of the courses
taught at University of Gothenburg. Although participants were
not explicitly instructed to use it, liars could use this brochure to
prepare a better cover story and truth tellers could use it to facil-
itate choosing a particular course. In addition, the participants
were motivated to plan by a number of explicit constraints; they
were instructed that they had only one chance to carry out the
task, and that they had a limited amount of time at their dis-
posal. In short, our experiment used a set-up that encouraged the
participants to imagine themselves acting at a particular time and
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place in the near future. After they had finished their planning, we
determined that they had understood the instructions.
Interview
Immediately after the planning phase, the participants were
brought to a nearby room where they expected to receive their
tram tickets. Instead, they were given a list of instructions that
asked them to imagine they would undergo a security check at
the library entrance. However, when trying to pass this secu-
rity check, they had been selected for further questioning. For
this imaginary scenario, the liars were told to use their cover
story, as convincingly as possible, to hide their criminal intention
whereas the truth tellers were told to tell the truth, as convinc-
ingly as possible, about their true intention. That is, both groups
were asked to speak about their book-search but while this story
was mirroring the truth tellers’ actual intention (true intentions),
the book-search was just a cover story for the liars (false inten-
tions). All participants were informed that the interviewer did
not know whether they were lying or telling the truth and they
were instructed to try to be as convincing as possible. Before leav-
ing the room, the experimenter made sure that each participant
understood the instructions. Then, all participants were inter-
viewed individually with a structured interview protocol asking
about their intentions, planning activities and the occurrence of
a mental image during the planning phase. The interview was
audio taped and the interviewer was blind to the participants’
truth status.
Post interview questionnaire
Immediately after the interview, the participants were asked to
complete self-ratings in a post interview questionnaire. The liars
were explicitly instructed to cease role-playing and to answer this
questionnaire truthfully. A manipulation check was conducted
with the aim of controlling for some basic elements. Then the
participants rated the degree of veracity of what she or he had
stated in the interview on a 7-point scale (1 = everything I told
was true, 7 = everything I told was untrue). In addition, the par-
ticipants were asked to rate the following basic features of the
planning phase on a 7-point scale: the difficulty of the planning
phase (1= very easy, 7= very difficult); how sufficient they found
the time allocated for the planning phase (1= not at all sufficient,
7 = totally sufficient); how satisfied they were with the planning
(1 = not at all satisfied, 7 = very satisfied); and how stimulating
(interesting) they found the planning (1 = not at all stimulating,
7= very stimulating).
Before completing the next section of the post interview ques-
tionnaire, the truth tellers were instructed to “Think back on the
planning,” whereas the liars were instructed to “Think back on the
planning of the cover story.” This section had ten questions related
to EFT: two global dimensions and eight specific dimensions of
the mental image. Participants rated these questions on 7-point
scales (1= to a very low extent, 7= to a very high extent). The first
global question was “To what extent did you form a mental image
while planning your errand [cover story]?” This question was fol-
lowed by a set of questions based on the Memory Characteristics
Questionnaire (MCQ) that is based in the reality-monitoring
framework (Johnson and Raye, 1981). Other researchers have
used this questionnaire to map subjective perceptions when peo-
ple pre-experience the future (e.g., see D’Argembeau and Van der
Linden, 2004; Szpunar and McDermott, 2008).
The eight questions about the participants’ subjective expe-
riences of specific dimensions concerned the mental image they
may have visualized in the planning phase. Three questions
addressed sensorial details (the degree to which the mental
image was characterized by (i) visual information, (ii) auditory
information, and (iii) smell/taste information). Three questions
addressed spatial information (the extent to which the mental
image was characterized by clarity with respect to (i) the spatial
location per se, (ii) the spatial location of objects, and (iii) the
spatial location of persons). Two questions addressed temporal
information (the extent to which the mental image was charac-
terized by clarity with respect to (i) the time of the day and (ii)
the temporal order of the event). We emphasize again that the
liars were instructed to think about and rate their mental images
when planning their cover stories (not the mental images when
planning the criminal events). The last question was the second
global question: “To sum up, how clearly did you pre-experience
the future event?” (for the truth tellers), and “To sum up, how
clearly did you pre-experience your cover story?” (for the liars).
Coding
All interviews were transcribed verbatim from the audio-tapes.
The answers to the question “At any point during your planning,
did you evoke a mental image of the future event?” were coded
(“Yes, a mental image was evoked,” or “No, a mental image was
not evoked.”). Two coders, who did not know who was a liar
and who was a truth teller, read and re-read the answers care-
fully in order to assign them to one of six dimensions of the type
of details. One coder rated all the answers (100%) and the other
rated only some answers (44%). They used a 7-point scale (1 =
to a low degree, 7 = to a high degree). The agreement between the
coders measured by the Intra-class Correlation Coefficient (ICC)
for consistency is considered acceptable/high. The ICC statistics
on the six dimensions are as follows: (1) the target library (ICC
= 0.910), (2) the navigation in the library (ICC = 0.887), (3) the
navigation to the library (ICC = 0.782), (4) visual details (i.e., all
physical information such as objects, people; ICC = 0.828), (5)
sensation/perception, which addressed what they felt, sensed or
how clearly they experienced their mental image (ICC = 0.752.),
and (6) obstacles which may have kept them from achieving their
goal (e.g., time pressure, people, not finding book; ICC= 0.710).
RESULTS
VERACITY
After the interview all participants rated (on a 7-point scale) the
extent to which they had lied during the interview. Liars (M =
4.33, SD = 2.00) rated the degree of lying significantly higher
than the truth tellers (M = 1.90, SD = 1.27), t(104) = 8.14, p <
0.001, d = 1.486. This result confirms that the participants fol-
lowed the instructions to lie or tell the truth.
FAMILIARITY
With respect to the familiarity with the experiment location (1 =
not familiar at all, 7 = highly familiar), the participants in the
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familiar-condition were at the upper end of the scale ranging
from 5 to 7 (M = 5.88, SD = 0.803). This result confirms these
participants were highly familiar with the location and that our
allocation was valid. However, we found no difference between
the familiar liars (M = 5.83, SD = 0.805) and the familiar
truth tellers (M = 5.93, SD = 0.813), F(55) = −0.471, p = 0.639,
η2 = −0.124.
PLANNING
We conducted a 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. Deceptive) × 2
(Location-Familiarity: Familiar vs. Unfamiliar) MANOVA with
the four planning ratings as dependent variables (i.e., satisfac-
tion with planning, satisfaction with time, perceived difficulty of
planning, and perceived stimulation of planning). The Location-
Familiarity main effect was not significant [F(4, 111) = 2.061,
p = 0.091, η2 = 0.069], but the Veracity main effect [F(4, 111) =
13.985, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.335] and the Veracity × Location-
Familiarity interaction effect were significant [F(4, 111) = 2.910,
p = 0.025, η2 = 0.095].
At the univariate level, the Veracity factor revealed significant
effects for satisfaction with planning, perceived difficulty of plan-
ning, and perceived stimulation of planning. That is, the truth
tellers (M = 5.43, SD = 1.40) were more satisfied with their
planning than the liars (M = 4.61, SD = 1.55), F(1, 115) = 9.158,
p = 0.003, η2 = 0.074. Critically, both groups rated their satis-
faction at the upper end of the scale. Furthermore, the liars (M =
3.85, SD = 1.64) perceived their planning as significantly more
difficult than the truth tellers [M = 2.62, SD = 1.60; F(1, 115) =
17.52, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.132]. Finally, the liars (M = 5.23, SD =
1.49) experienced the planning as significantly more stimulating
than the truth tellers (M = 3.79, SD = 1.69), F(1, 115) = 27.08,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.191.
Regarding the interaction effect, univariate tests revealed
a significant effect for the perceived stimulation of planning,
F(1, 115) = 7.048, p = 0.009, η2 = 0.058. In other words, liars
and truth tellers rated their planning as equally stimulating
(or interesting) when they were unfamiliar with the location.
However, when the location was familiar, truth tellers (vs.
liars) perceived the planning as significantly less stimulating
(see Table 1).
OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF THE MENTAL IMAGE (INTERVIEW)
Reporting a mental image during the interview
A chi-square analysis revealed that significantly more truth tellers
than liars reported a mental image (truth tellers: 54 of 58 (93.1%);
liars: 43 of 62 (69.4%); χ2 (N = 120) = 11.18, p = 0.001). This
Table 1 | Means (and standard deviations) of planning for Veracity
and Location-Familiarity.
Subjective ratings Truth tellers Liars
Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar
Satisfaction, planning
Satisfaction, time
Planning, difficulty
Planning, stimulating
5.63 (1.21)
5.93 (1.84)
2.22 (1.42)
5.16 (1.40)
5.20 (1.54)
5.70 (1.77)
2.97 (1.71)
4.84 (1.63)
4.71 (1.44)
5.50 (1.45)
3.82 (1.52)
5.32 (1.42)
4.52 (1.66)
4.91 (1.74)
3.88 (1.76)
5.15 (1.56)
result lends support to Hypothesis 1. No difference was found
between the familiar participants (48 of 57; 84.2%) compared to
the unfamiliar participants (49 of 63; 77.8%); χ2 (N = 120) =
0.799, p = 0.371).
Type of details
We conducted a 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. Deceptive) × 2
(Location-Familiarity: Familiar vs. Unfamiliar) MANOVA (with
the six self-ratings pertaining to the descriptions of the mental
image as the dependent variables). We found a significant multi-
variate effect for Location-Familiarity [F(6, 84) = 6.73, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.326]. However, the Veracity main effect [F(6, 84) = 0.983,
p = 0.442, η2 = 0.066] and the Veracity × Location-Familiarity
interaction effect were not significant [F(6, 84) = 0.981, p = 0.444
η2 = 0.065]. Thus, we failed to find support for Hypothesis 2a
and Hypothesis 2b (see Table 2).
Univariate tests for Location-Familiarity revealed signif-
icant main effects for target library, [Familiar: M = 4.65,
SD = 1.77; Unfamiliar: M = 2.9, SD = 1.42; F(1, 93) = 26.891,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.224] and for navigating in the library,
[Familiar: M = 3.63, SD = 1.76; Unfamiliar: M = 2.33, SD =
1.31; F(1, 93) = 16.085, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.147]. Unfamiliar par-
ticipants (M = 2.55, SD = 2.04) spoke more about navigating
to the library than the familiar participants (M = 1.83, SD =
1.55). This difference bordered on significance [F(1, 93) = 3.699,
p = 0.058, η2 = 0.038]. Thus, individuals who were familiar with
the library referred to this location and navigating in this loca-
tion to a significantly greater extent than individuals who were
unfamiliar with the library. In comparison, the participants who
were unfamiliar with the library tended to refer to navigating
to the library more often than participants who were famil-
iar with the library. Unfamiliar participants (M = 3.57, SD =
1.26) addressed obstacles to a significantly greater degree in
their mental images than familiar participants [M = 2.89, SD =
1.39; F(1, 89) = 6.434, p = 0.013, η2 = 0.067]. Familiar (M =
2.14, SD = 1.13) and unfamiliar participants (M = 2.24, SD =
1.32) did not differ with respect to perception/sensation; F(1, 89) =
0.120, p = 0.730, η2 = 0.001) and visual details [Familiar: M =
4.93, SD = 1.42; Unfamiliar: M = 4.69, SD = 1.36; F(1, 89) =
0.556, p = 0.458, η2 = 0.006]. In other words, familiar and unfa-
miliar participants referred to visual details and their perception
and sensation to a similar degree.
Table 2 | Means (and standard deviations) of the type of details for
Veracity and Location-Familiarity.
Objective ratings Truth tellers Liars
Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar
Library
Navigation in library
Navigation to library
Visual details
Perception/sensation
Obstacles
4.69 (1.83)
3.73 (1.64)
1.69 (1.35)
4.86 (1.36)
2.18 (0.91)
3.18 (1.47)
2.46 (1.17)
2.29 (1.36)
2.46 (1.92)
4.57 (1.43)
2.36 (1.25)
3.50 (1.12)
4.59 (1.74)
3.50 (1.92)
2.00 (1.77)
5.00 (1.51)
2.09 (1.34)
2.59 (1.26)
3.48 (1.54)
2.38 (1.28)
2.67 (2.24)
4.86 (1.28)
2.10 (1.41)
3.67 (1.46)
Note that all ratings for the liars pertain to how they perceived their cover story.
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SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF THE MENTAL IMAGE (POST INTERVIEW
QUESTIONNAIRE)
We conducted a 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs. Deceptive) × 2
(Location: Familiar vs. Unfamiliar) MANOVA with the eight
subjective ratings of the specific dimensions pertaining to the
participants’ perception of their mental image as dependent vari-
ables. The two global ratings were excluded from the MANOVA
as they constitute combined ratings. We found significant mul-
tivariate effects for Veracity [F(8, 106) = 3.917, p < 0.001, η2 =
0.228] and Location-Familiarity [F(8, 106) = 3.641, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.207], but no Veracity × Location-Familiarity interaction
effect [F(8, 106) = 0.828, p = 0.580, η2 = 0.059].
Vividness of the specific dimensions
Regarding Veracity, the analysis of each dependent variable
showed three significant main effects. First, the sensory dimen-
sion revealed differences for the visual information [truth
tellers: M = 6.09, SD = 1.26; liars: M = 5.48, SD = 1.51;
F(1, 115) = 5.831, p = 0.017, η2 = 0.048], and smell/taste [truth
tellers: M = 1.74, SD = 1.25; liars: M = 1.34, SD = 0.77;
F(1, 115) = 4.66, p = 0.033, η2 = 0.039]. Hence, truth tellers
experienced visual information and smell/taste to a greater extent
than liars. It is noteworthy that the visual information was (unlike
smell/taste) rated at the higher end of the scale, which indicates
that this aspect plays an important role in the visualization
of future events. Unexpectedly, the liars perceived the position
of other people significantly more clearly than the truth tellers
[truth tellers: M = 3.12, SD = 1.79; liars: M = 4.23, SD = 1.85;
F(1, 114) = 10.54, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.085]. Hence, Hypothesis 3a
was partially supported.
Regarding the Location-Familiarity, the analysis of each
dependent variable showed significant main effects for three
ratings: visual information [Familiar: M = 6.16, SD = 1.16;
Unfamiliar: M = 5.43, SD = 1.55; F(1, 115) = 8.36, p = 0.005,
η2 = 0.068], location [Familiar: M = 5.77, SD = 1.16;
Unfamiliar: M = 4.65, SD = 1.69; F(1, 115) = 17.32, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.131], and position of objects [Familiar: M = 5.63,
SD = 1.34; Unfamiliar: M = 4.52, SD = 1.79; F(1, 115) = 13.82,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.107]. Thus, the participants who were
familiar with the library experienced the location itself and
how objects were arranged more clearly than the partici-
pants who had never been in the library before. Furthermore,
the familiar participants perceived the visual information
of their mental images more clearly than the unfamiliar
participants.
Vividness of the global dimensions
In addition, we conducted two 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs.
Deceptive) × 2 (Location-Familiarity: Familiar vs. Unfamiliar)
ANOVAs on the two subjective ratings of the global dimensions
pertaining to (a) the extent to which participants visualized
mental images in the planning phase and (b) the overall clarity
of the mental image. The results revealed that the truth tellers
(M = 5.52, SD = 1.19) experienced their mental image of
the future significantly more clearly than the liars [M = 5.00,
SD = 1.44; F(1, 115) = 4.67, p = 0.033, η2 = 0.039]. However,
no significant differences were found for Location-Familiarity
Table 3 | Means (and standard deviations) of the mental images’
vividness for Veracity and Location-Familiarity.
Subjective ratings Truth tellers Liars
Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar
GLOBAL
Extent 5.54 (1.50) 5.33 (0.96) 5.46 (1.64) 4.88 (1.67)
Overall clarity 5.60 (1.1) 5.09 (1.35) 5.56 (1.22) 5.15 (1.26)
SPECIFIC
Visual 6.54 (0.92) 5.76 (1.33) 5.79 (1.26) 5.16 (1.67)
Auditory 1.89 (1.47) 1.97 (0.98) 1.93 (1.27) 2.38 (1.50)
Smell/taste 2.00 (1.44) 1.52 (1.02) 1.32 (0.67) 1.38 (0.87)
Location 6.07 (0.90) 4.79 (1.37) 5.46 (1.32) 4.72 (1.82)
Position, objects 5.57 (1.33) 4.62 (1.55) 5.54 (1.37) 4.41 (1.98)
Position, people 3.36 (1.79) 2.90 (1.61) 4.14 (1.86) 4.41 (1.79)
Time of day 3.54 (2.03) 3.48 (2.18) 2.89 (1.75) 3.53 (1.95)
Temporal order 4.75 (1.80) 5.03 (1.57) 4.75 (1.74) 4.84 (1.54)
Note that all ratings for the liars pertain to how they perceived their cover story.
[F(1, 115) = 3.15, p = 0.079, η2 = 0.027] or for the interaction
effect [F(1, 115) = 0.91, p = 0.343, η2 = 0.008] (see Table 3).
Regarding the extent to which participants visualized men-
tal images in planning their future actions, the results revealed
no main effect for Veracity [F(1, 115) = 0.942, p = 0.334, η2 =
0.008], no main effect for Location-Familiarity [F(1, 115) = 2.11,
p = 0.149, η2 = 0.018], and no interaction effect [F(1, 115) =
0.500, p = 0.481, η2 = 0.004].
DISCUSSION
The main purpose was to examine to what extent location-
familiarity moderates how liars and truth tellers describe a mental
image in an investigative interview. Similar to a recent study by
Warmelink et al. (2012), familiarity was not found to have a
moderating effect in this respect. Yet, some important observa-
tions could be made with respect to the role of prototypical and
specific representations in prospection. As suggested by the self-
ratings, truth tellers tend to experience their mental images more
vividly during planning than liars. Hence, truth tellers experience
the future in a comparatively more specific manner. However,
the descriptions of the mental images provided in the interview
did not show the same difference between liars and truth tellers.
In other words, the findings of this study show a discrepancy
betweenmental images described (data derived from the interview
transcripts) andmental images experienced (data derived from the
post interview questionnaire) which suggests that both specific
and prototypical representations play a role in prospection. How
this observation can be helpful for distinguishing between true
and false intentions will be discussed.
INTERVIEW
Reporting a mental image
In line with our hypothesis we found that the truth tellers (93.2%)
reported a mental image more often in an interview than liars
(69.4%). We can think of two possible and complementing rea-
sons for this finding. First, it is possible that true intentions were
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accompanied by more vivid mental images than false intentions.
This explanation would support the assumption that prospection,
and evoking mental images in particular, is affected by the com-
mitment of a person to execute a specific future action. Second,
it is possible that the liars and the truth tellers used different
strategies for handling the interview situation. Liars typically tend
to keep their stories simple and try to avoid revealing possibly
incriminating information in an interview whereas truth tellers
tend toward “telling it like it was” and “keeping the story real”
(Granhag and Strömwall, 2002; Strömwall et al., 2006). Hence, it
is possible that the liars did not report a mental image in order to
avoid that this piece of information could be used against them.
In conclusion, the different strategies, in combination with a
less distinct mental image, may explain why fewer liars reported
a mental image than truth tellers. This finding which successfully
replicated past research (Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al.,
2013a,b) suggests that if a person does not report a mental image,
it is likely that this person is a liar.
Content of the mental image
No differences were found with respect to the content of the men-
tal images liars and truth tellers described during the investigative
interview. This is noteworthy considering that the self-ratings
indicate that such a difference exists between liars and truth tellers
when they plan their future actions. One explanation for this
finding is that truth tellers were not able to properly verbalize
the vividness they experienced during planning when asked to
describe their mental images in the investigative interview. As
a consequence, the descriptions of liars and truth tellers were
indistinguishable.
Our direct comparison between familiar and unfamiliar par-
ticipants showed that participants have the tendency to talk about
familiar themes in an investigative interview. More precisely, the
familiar participants spoke about familiar themes related to the
setting (the target library and navigating in the library) whereas
the unfamiliar participants spoke about familiar themes differ-
ent from the setting (navigating to the library). In other words,
both familiar and unfamiliar participants relied to a large extent
on prototypical information. In line with previous research (Bar,
2007; Kane et al., 2012), this observation indicates the relevance
of prototypical representations in prospection. Furthermore, we
argue that prototypical representations can, at least in part,
explain why liars’ and truth tellers’ descriptions of their mental
images provided during the investigative interview did not reveal
any differences.
In conclusion, it is possible that both liars and truth tellers
relied on more prototypical information to describe their mental
image in the interview, irrespective of whether they were able to
provide more specific information. In fact, liars and truth tellers
mainly referred to spatial information in their descriptions which
suggests that they may have used information from an existing
prototype of a library.
Familiarity
Another finding from the direct comparison between famil-
iar and unfamiliar participants was that unfamiliar partici-
pants addressed obstacles more often than familiar participants.
Foreseeing potential obstacles is associated with more extensive
planning (Xiao et al., 1997; Mumford et al., 2001). To date,
the exact relation between specific representations of the future
such as EFT and planning is still rather unclear (Szpunar, 2010).
However, recent research indicates that planning requires both
specific and prototypical representations (Martin-Ordas et al.,
2012). The results of the present study suggest that the necessity
to plan may affect to which extent we deliberate about obstacles.
Differently put, it is possible that the unfamiliar participants were
more motivated to plan, and to foresee obstacles for that matter,
because they had never been to the particular library.
POST INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Vividness of the mental image
As predicted, the truth tellers experienced the extent to which they
visualized the future while planning, and specifically the sensory
information, more vividly than the liars. In contrast to the pre-
diction, the liars experienced the position of other people signifi-
cantly more clearly than the truth tellers which may be due to that
liars attributed more relevance to other people than truth tellers.
All participants knew there would be a person in the library who
was part of the study. However, it was optional for truth tellers to
approach this person (to get help if needed); liars were required
to approach this person (the envelope was supposed to be deliv-
ered to this person). This finding indicates that the relevance that
a detail has for accomplishing a personal goal affects how clearly
we experience this detail. This observation adds support to the
link made earlier between specific representations of the future
and goal-achievement (D’Argembeau and Mathy, 2011).
Regarding location-familiarity, the results suggest that spatial
information plays a fundamental role in prospection. More pre-
cisely, the familiar participants experienced the location and the
position of objects more clearly than the unfamiliar participants.
This lends support to the view that the process of scene con-
struction is critically involved in future thinking (Hassabis and
Maguire, 2007). Scene construction entails retrieving and inte-
grating perceptual, semantic, and contextual information into a
coherent spatial context. However, although generic aspects such
as those relating to the location are certainly fundamental ele-
ments for the construction of a more concrete mental image of
the future, scene construction alone may lack the episodic flavor
associated with EFT.
Planning
The results show that the planning of the future actions was more
difficult for liars than for truth tellers. This may also explain why
the liars were less satisfied with their planning. These two find-
ings are not surprising as describing events in detail is typically
more cognitively challenging for liars than for truth tellers (Vrij,
2008). It can be argued that this difference was caused by that liars
had more to plan than truth tellers. However, that liars and truth
tellers both show a strong satisfaction with the time allocated for
planning works against this explanation. The lack of a difference
between familiar and unfamiliar participants indicates that the
planning did not cause problems for the participants who had
never been to the particular library before. Hence, being unfamil-
iar with the location was not more challenging than being familiar
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 677 | 7
Knieps et al. True and false intentions
with it, but lying was experienced as more challenging than truth
telling. This finding indicates that increasing the cognitive load
further may have an effect on liars in particular.
LIMITATIONS
The concept of familiarity has some limitations. First, as we
measured familiarity by the participants’ self-ratings, our catego-
rization depends on the accuracy of those ratings. However, we do
not see any reason to doubt the reliability of the ratings. Second,
as we only compared participants with rich memory of the loca-
tion with participants with no memory of the location, there are
many levels of familiarity between these two extreme positions
that we did not consider in the present study.
Our research reflects future events in which the external con-
ditions (i.e., the where, when, and what) are clearly defined.
However, this is not the case for all statements about future
events that require veracity assessments. Hence, the generalizabil-
ity of our findings is therefore limited. Although this research
covers only some of the possible future-related scenarios, there
are numerous scenarios in real life (e.g., airport security checks)
where most external conditions are specified at the time of
questioning.
In this study liars were required to plan two tasks (a criminal
action and a cover story) whereas truth tellers were required to
plan only one task (a non-criminal action). In order to exclude
the possibility that this difference between the conditions would
result in a confound, we offered both liars and truth tellers more
time to plan if needed. However, only 13 out of 120 participants
(eight liars and five truth tellers) took advantage of this extra time.
Furthermore, we employed self-ratings which revealed that both
liars and truth tellers were satisfied to a high extent with the time
allocated for planning. These findings suggest that both liars and
truth tellers had enough time to plan their future actions.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The results of this study indicate that although the self-ratings
showed a difference between how vividly liars and truth tellers
experience their mental images, no such difference was captured
by the interview. This finding may be due to too insensitive
interview questions. That is, it is possible that people describe
prototypical information when undergoing an investigative inter-
view although they may have more specific information available.
The truth tellers may have provided more specific information in
their descriptions, but—without prompting—they did not think
about all the details of their mental image. Asking people to
describe the full mental image that they have experienced might
be viewed as a true challenge. Warmelink et al. (2012) argue that
the experienced information needs to be actively retrieved before
it can be described. Without such prompting, there is a risk that
people will not think (and tell) about the details they experienced.
This is supported by research which shows that people often have
a considerable amount of information available that they do not
convey without prompts (Fisher, 2010; Fisher et al., 2011). A
recent study which examined the effect of memory-enhancing
techniques lends support to the assumption that the framing of
the questions help truth tellers (but not liars) to actively retrieve
details from episodic memory (Sooniste et al., submitted).
The use of insensitive questionsmay also explain why location-
familiarity was not found to moderate liars’ and truth tellers’
descriptions during the investigative interview. The role that
specific and prototypical representations play in prospection
and how this knowledge can be used to frame questions that
more efficiently address genuine EFT is a topic for future
research.
CONCLUSIONS AND PSYCHO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The results of the present study provide important insight into
how people think of, and commit to, a future action. Lie-catchers
may benefit from these findings on prospection and we will make
some suggestions on how to use this knowledge in the investiga-
tive process. First, we believe that unanticipated questions should
be asked. Questioning the participants about a mental image they
may have “seen” while planning the future actions resulted in a
greater amount of liars who denied having experienced such an
image. This result suggests that if a person does not report a men-
tal image in an interview, then he or she is very likely to be a
liar. Second, be very careful in categorizing a statement as truth-
ful just because it contains a great deal spatial details. A popular
instrument to assess the veracity of written statements in sev-
eral West-European countries, such as Sweden, Germany and the
Netherlands and in parts of the USA, the Criteria-Based Content
Analysis (CBCA) (Vrij, 2008), regards the quantity of detail in a
statement as an indicator for the truth. Our study indicates that
people tend to rely on prototypical information, and spatial infor-
mation referring to locations and navigating in particular, when
describing a mental image of the future. Hence, there is a risk that
a false statement may mistakenly be taken for a true statement
just because it contains a detailed description of the location.
Lie-catchers should rather focus on more specific representa-
tions of the future such as EFT which emphasizes the subjective
experience of prospection (such as visual perspective and emo-
tion, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004). Third, identify
the elements that are important and necessary for an individual
to execute the stated intention such as the obstacles the plan-
ner may face when trying to execute the planned actions. Even
though we found no differences between liars and truth tellers
with respect to obstacles in this study, it appears to be of rele-
vance in prospection. It may be worthwhile in future research to
examine whether suspects address these aspects in their descrip-
tions of a mental image. Lying is a cognitively demanding task
(Vrij, 2008) and answering may be more difficult for individ-
uals who have not genuinely planned to execute their stated
intention.
In conclusion, the results of this study lend partial support to
the assumption that specific representations of the future such as
EFT are helpful in discriminating between true and false inten-
tions. Although no clear differences were found in the content
of liars’ and truth tellers’ descriptions of their mental images, it
may be too hasty to reject the assumption that EFT is a helpful
concept for eliciting cues to deception. The absence of differ-
ences between liars and truth tellers may be due to methods that
were too insensitive to elicit descriptions reflecting genuine EFT.
Framing questions that more efficiently address genuine EFT is a
topic for future research.
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